During the past two decades, a silent revolution in public sector governance has swept across the globe aiming to move decision making for local public services closer to the people. The countries embracing and adapting to this silent revolution have had diverse motives and followed even more diverse approaches. This paper attempts to present a stylized view of the motivations and approaches used to strengthen local governance.
Abstract/Summary of Results:
During the past two decades, a silent revolution in public sector governance has swept across the globe aiming to move decision making for local public services closer to the people. The countries embracing and adapting to this silent revolution have had diverse motives and followed even more diverse approaches. This paper attempts to present a stylized view of the motivations and approaches used to strengthen local governance.
The quest for the right balance, i.e. appropriate division of powers among different levels of government, is not always the primary reason for decentralizing. There is evidence that the decentralization decision may have more to do with short-term political considerations than the long-run benefits of decentralization. To take stock of progress worldwide, we take a comparative look at developments in political, fiscal and administrative decentralization for a selected group of countries.
Most of the decentralization literature deals with normative issues regarding the assignment of responsibilities among different levels of government and the design of fiscal transfers. The process of decentralization has not received the attention it deserves as the best laid plans can fail due to implementation difficulties. We revisit major controversies regarding preferred approaches to obtaining a successful outcome. Key approaches examined are big push versus small steps; bottom up vs. top down; and uniform vs. asymmetric decentralization.
Finally, Indonesia's 1999 "big bang" decentralization program is evaluated. The program should be commended for its achievements over a short period of time, however incentives are lacking for local governments to be accountable and responsive to their residents.
Introduction
During the past two decades, a silent revolution in public sector governance has swept across the globe 3 . This revolution aims to move decision making for local public services closer to the people. The interest in this new paradigm of public governance has further been heightened by the information revolution and globalization of economic activity, which tends to weaken the central government at the expense of supranational regimes and local governments.
The countries embracing and adapting to this silent revolution have had diverse motives and followed even more diverse approaches. This paper attempts to present a stylized view of the motivations and the approaches and processes used to strengthen localization. In doing so, it attempts to draw lessons of some general interest on the process and substance of decentralization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the reader to basic concepts in decentralization. Section 2 is concerned with the motivations for decentralization. Section 3 presents a worldwide overview of decentralization efforts. Section 4 is concerned with the processes of decentralization and examines sequencing issues. Section 5 deals with sustainability and local capture issues. Section 6 draws lessons for the future of the decentralization process in Indonesia that began in 1999.
Decentralization: Some Basic Concepts
A review of basic concepts commonly used in the decentralization literature is presented below so as to facilitate communications in subsequent sections.
• The subsidiarity principle states that public service responsibilities must be exercised by the lowest level of government unless a convincing case can be made for higher level assignment.
• A unitary country has a single or multi-tiered government in which effective control of government functions rests with the central government.
• A federal form of government has a multilayered structure with decision making shared by all levels of government.
• In a confederal system of government, the central government serves as the agent of member units, usually without independent taxing and spending powers. The European Union is an important example of a confederal form of government.
Switzerland has a confederal constitution but is considered a federal country in practice.
• Devolution means empowering people politically.
• Localization means decentralization of decision making to the local level. It is pursued through political, administrative and fiscal decentralization.
• Political or democratic decentralization implies directly elected local governments thereby making elected officials accountable to citizens.
• Administrative decentralization empowers these governments to hire and fire local staff (thereby making local officials accountable to elected officials) without any reference to higher-level governments.
• Fiscal decentralization ensures that all elected officials weigh carefully the joys of spending someone else's money as well as the pain associated with raising revenues from the electorate and facing the possibility of being voted out.
• Administrative deconcentration, where decision making is shifted to regional and local offices of the central government, would not be consistent with administrative decentralization.
• Similarly administrative delegation where local governments undertake activities on behalf of the higher-level governments falls short of administrative decentralization.
Why Are Countries Decentralizing? Not Always for the Right Balance
The reasons for rethinking fiscal arrangements are manifold and the importance of each factor is country specific. Table 1 presents prime motivations in recent decentralization moves. The table shows that the quest for right balance, i.e. appropriate division of powers among different levels of government, is not always the primary reason for implementing decentralization. Instead various political and economic events have often triggered such an interest. Table 1 shows that on the domestic front, political considerations have been the major catalyst in initiating a process of decentralization. These considerations had broader goals of political and economic transformation and aspirations for European Union membership in former centrally planned economies. In most other countries, the agenda for reform was driven by ethnic and regional conflicts and fiscal crisis.
Interestingly enough, in some countries, such as Indonesia and Pakistan, decentralization processes that had been stuck in the mud for a long time got a big boost by political and fiscal crises. In Peru and Pakistan, recent decentralization moves had their origins in attempts by regimes in power to sideline or weaken potential opposition.
While the political process of decentralization is important, it is an issue that has not yet been explored in the literature as highlighted by the following quotes:
What is efficient-or even optimal-from an economic viewpoint might not always be sustainable politically. I believe one of the greatest challenges ahead of us as formal scholars of federalism is to synthesize the two branches of the literature, to consider how policy efficiency and political feasibility are related…Questions of when to decentralize, how, and to whom-questions regularly raised by the policy literature-might not be best answered by examining policy efficiency, but instead ought to be informed by work on political feasibility. Political scientists see federalism as a way to promote political stability in fractured societies (see Susan Rose-Ackerman, 2000) . This seems to have been part of the reason for decentralization in Uganda where there is a geographical divide among ethnic groups.
There is some evidence to show that the decision to decentralize may have more to do with short-term political considerations of politicians rather than being based on the perceived benefits of decentralization in the long run. Eaton (2001) suggests the following possible political motivations for decentralization:
i. Decentralization might be a voluntary choice of politicians-it can increase political stability and economic growth in a way that compensates politicians for any loss of power they may experience in the short run (see also Manor, 1999) .
ii. Decentralization may result from political pressures exerted by sub-national politicians. If sub-national politicians can influence the political careers of their representatives in the national assembly, these legislators may be coerced into supporting decentralization (according to Willis et al, 1999) . In Brazil, the return to democracy in the 1980s set the stage for fiscal decentralization when governors regained political influence.
iii. Decentralization may reflect short-term gains for politicians, since politicians usually discount future gains heavily. When government is divided, the party in control of the legislature may promote decentralization as a way to constrain the executive branch. Experiences of Argentina and the Philippines suggest that political struggles over the control of revenues and expenditures may have less to do with substantive debates over development strategy than with short-term and highly dynamic political calculations.
External influences through globalization and the information revolution are also having profound influences on the division of power within nations. The information revolution has weakened the ability of governments to control information flows. With globalization, it is increasingly becoming apparent that nation states are too small to tackle large things in life and too large to address small things. More simply, nation states are fast loosing control of some of their areas of traditional control and regulation, such as regulation of external trade, telecommunications, and financial transactions. National governments are experiencing diminished control in their ability to control the flow of goods and services, ideas and cultural products. These difficulties are paving the way for 
What Are They Decentralizing and For What Purposes?
Moving decision-making closer to people requires that citizens have voice and exit options for local governance (political decentralization). In addition, local governments they elect should be allowed home rule in fiscal, regulatory and administrative matters (fiscal and administrative decentralization). All of these elements must be in place to ensure effective decision making at the local level. It is interesting to note that very few developing countries have adopted such a comprehensive approach to the decentralization of decision-making. To take stock of the progress of decentralization worldwide, we take a comparative look at key aspects of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization for a selected group of countries representing each region.
From country experiences, we develop a stylized view of regional progress on decentralization (see Appendix Tables 1 -3) .
The focus of this paper, by design, is on decentralization to municipal-local governments (such as municipalities, cities, and districts). This is because such a focus enables us to get a comparative perspective as to the extent decision making has been Overall, during the last two decades, there have been major gains in political decentralization worldwide with South America and Eastern Europe having completed their agenda for reform in this area. Other regions have also shown progress but progress has been quite slow in Central America and non-existent in the Middle East and North Africa regions (see Appendix Table 1 ).
Administrative Decentralization
Effective administrative decentralization requires lack of any ex ante controls over the decision to hire, fire and set terms of employment of local staff. To improve tax collection or the delivery of local public services, local government should have the freedom to contract own taxing and spending responsibilities. Furthermore, local governments should have the authority to pass bylaws in their spheres of responsibility without having to obtain prior clearance from the higher level government.
In practice however, local governments in a large majority of countries do not have the authority to hire and fire senior local staff. Eastern European countries represent an important exception in this regard. The freedom to contract own responsibilities is typically available but this option in some cases, e.g. in the Philippines, is constrained to the expenditure side only. Regulatory authority for municipal services is usually available to local governments in most countries, although in Indonesia local government regulations have to be approved by the central government. Overall, there has been significant progress in administrative decentralization in developing countries in recent years (see Appendix Table 2 ). Such progress has been much slower in the area of local government autonomy for own civil service. In Pakistan, lack of such autonomy is considered the Achilles' heel of the devolution plan, as the provincially transferred civil servants have no personal stake in the success of the devolution. In Indonesia, the central government sets the minimum salaries for civil servants of sub-national governments.
Fiscal Decentralization 4
Fiscal decentralization has three important components: (a) revenue autonomy and adequacy; (b) expenditure autonomy and; (c) borrowing privileges. The progress in these areas is reviewed in the following paragraphs (see also Appendix Table 3 ). 5 Note that due to data limitations, the figures in these sections refer to sub-national levels (intermediate and local governments combined) rather than just local governments alone.
(a) Revenue Autonomy and Adequacy
The theoretical literature on fiscal federalism suggests that decentralization of taxing powers may not fully match the decentralization of expenditure and regulatory functions. This is largely because taxes on mobile bases and multi-stage sales taxes are better assigned to the national government in the interest of tax harmonization. However, in developing and transition economies (DTEs), centralization of taxing responsibilities is much more pronounced than would be based on economic considerations. In some countries, such as Mexico and Pakistan, the national government raises more than 90% of 4 The section on Fiscal Decentralization draws on Shah, Anwar (2004) . "Fiscal Decentralization in Developing and Transition Economies: Progress, Problems and the Promise" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 3282. Washington, D.C. 5 While the focus of this paper is on decentralization to the local level of government, the lack of available statistics on local government finance has resulted in our resort to the use of sub-national expenditures and revenues from the Government Finance Statistics database (IMF) in this section. Shah 2001 Shah , 1988 for practical difficulties with a sub-national VAT) but several Indian States have introduced multi-stage sales taxes.
Local governments have very limited access to own source revenues such as property taxes and user charges and even for these limited tax bases, they typically have autonomy only with respect to rate setting within limits. The above discussion implicitly assumes that assignment of taxes entails control over tax base, tax rates and collection authority. This need not be the case and higher level governments may instead, in the interest of harmonization and minimizing collection and compliance costs, allow lower level governments to either levy a supplementary rate on their own base (tax base sharing) or agree to share the proceeds from specific taxes in a pre-determined way (shared taxes). Under such arrangements, tax base determination usually rests with the higher-level government, with lower levels of government levying supplementary rates on the same base. Tax collection is by one level of government, generally the central government in market economies and the local government in transition economies with proceeds shared downward or upward depending upon revenue yields. Only a handful of developing and transition economies have adopted tax base sharing. A sub-national surcharge on the personal income tax is permitted in Brazil and Croatia. Russia allows a surcharge on corporate income tax.
Provincial governments in Pakistan allow local governments to have a supplementary rate on property transfer taxes. While the practice of tax base sharing is uncommon, sharing the proceeds of various taxes on a tax-by-tax basis is frequently practiced in DTEs. Shared taxes are more akin to transfers than autonomous local government revenue since local governments have no say over neither the base nor rate of the tax. In transition economies, in 1999, 49.3% of sub-national government revenues were obtained from shared taxes (see World Bank, 2001) . In developing countries, the role of shared taxes in financing sub-national governments is of lesser significance as general revenue sharing is widely practiced.
While giving local authorities some tax authority in principle should increase accountability of local officials to the electorate, giving local governments too much leeway can also present problems, especially when the central government reserves for itself all of the productive taxes. For instance, one local council in Tanzania set up 60 "nuisance" taxes and fees that serve little more than to make the system non-transparent (see Brosio, 2000) . Nuisance taxes have also been implemented in some parts of Indonesia, but the central government is trying to limit this distortionary trend by canceling such local government regulations implementing them. Quite a large number of central governments are involved in local functions. Out of a sample of 33 countries for which details on the assignment of local functions are available, primary education is the sole responsibility of the center in 12 countries and in additional 9 countries central government is involved in this service along with local governments (see Table 2 for details on central government involvement in local functions). This ratio ranges from 4% to 95% for individual countries. The transfers constituted 75-95% of sub-national revenues in Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Pakistan and South Africa.
The design of these transfers is of critical importance for efficiency and equity of local service provision, autonomy, and fiscal health of sub-national governments (see for general principles and better practices in grant design). To enhance accountability it is desirable to match revenue means (the ability to raise revenues from own sources) as closely as possible with expenditure needs at all levels of government.
However, higher level governments must be allowed greater access to revenues than needed to fulfill own direct service responsibilities so that they are able to use their spending power through fiscal transfers to fulfill national and regional efficiency and equity objectives. We can identify six broad objectives for national fiscal transfers, each of which suggests a specific design of such transfers (see also Table 3 ). In the following, we examine adherence to these principles in practice in DTEs. ii. Fiscal equalization transfers to correct fiscal inequities and fiscal inefficiencies arising from differentials in regional fiscal capacities have been adopted in a number of Eastern conflicting objectives into the same formula and fall significantly short on individual objectives. Because the formulae lack explicit equalization standards, they fail to address regional equity objectives satisfactorily.
iii. Open ended matching grants with the matching rate determined by benefit to compensate for benefit spillovers are not practiced. Although benefit-cost spill-out is a serious factor in a number of countries, such transfers have not been implemented in developing countries with the single exception of South Africa. South Africa provides a closed-ended matching grant to teaching hospitals based upon an estimate of benefit spillovers associated with enrollment of non-local students and use of hospital facilities by non-residents. Bank, 2000 and World Bank, 2001) . Almost all DTEs with the exception of South Africa and Hungary do not have a regulatory framework for declaring local government bankruptcy. In a few countries credit market assistance is available through specialized institutions and central guarantees to jump start municipal access to credit. The menu of choices available to local governments for financing capital projects is quite limited and available alternatives are not conducive to developing a sustainable institutional environment for such finance. This is because macroeconomic instability and lack of fiscal discipline and appropriate regulatory regimes have impeded the development of financial and capital markets. In addition, revenue capacity at the local level is limited due to tax centralization. A first transitory step to provide limited credit market access to local governments may be to establish municipal finance corporations run on commercial principles and to encourage the development of municipal rating agencies to assist in such borrowing. Tax decentralization is also important to establish private sector confidence in lending to local governments and sharing in the risks and rewards of such lending.
How Do We Get There? Revisiting Major Controversies on the Process of

Decentralization.
Most of the decentralization literature (see Shah, 1988 for surveys of this literature) deals with normative issues regarding the assignment of responsibilities among different levels of government and the design of fiscal transfers. The process of decentralization has not received the attention it deserves as the best laid plans can go awry due to implementation difficulties. In this section, we revisit major issues and controversies regarding preferred approaches to obtaining a successful outcome. Key approaches examined are big push versus small steps; bottom up vs. top down; and uniform vs. asymmetric decentralization. In addressing these approaches, the role of inadequate capacity as a constraint to development is also examined.
Big Bang vs. Gradualism
The literature on federalism calls for a holistic approach to division of powers within nations. This entails an integrated approach to decentralization so that major decisions on political, administrative and fiscal decentralization are adopted as a single package. (Note that crystallization of such an approach may entail a long drawn out process of democratic consultations and consensus building at the grassroots levels.) Such a package of reforms when implemented in a single initiative and implemented over a relatively short period of time would constitute a "big bang" approach to decentralization. A big bang approach has two defining characteristics; (a) it is holistic (comprehensive) and; (b) it is implemented at lightening speed. Such an approach has a number of meritorious elements. The holistic approach ensures that all pieces of the puzzle fit together-i.e. the desired balance in autonomy and accountability is achieved while providing incentives for cost efficiency. This balance might not be achieved under piecemeal reform. For example, if expenditure decentralization is not accompanied by revenue decentralization, the decentralization plan may fail to fully take into account local governments' fiscal capacity and fiscal needs, the availability of good sources of local revenue, the trade-off between equity and efficiency, and the inefficiencies caused by high vertical imbalances (that lead to a lack of incentive for revenue effort and reduced accountability). If political decentralization occurs without fiscal decentralization, people may quickly become disenchanted with decentralization in general because there are no tangible benefits from the reform. Rarely is there some unique moment in the political history of a nation that permits such systemic reforms to be feasible. A lightening speed represents the best use of this window of opportunity. This is because all such reforms create winners and losers, and it is generally the central government, which stands to lose power from decentralization that must implement it.
Decentralization reforms empower people and local politicians at the expense of national politicians and bureaucrats. If the reforms are planned to take place over a longer period of time, the latter may be given an opportunity to organize, and they are likely to build coalitions to circumvent reforms.
In contrast to the big bang approach, a gradualist approach calls for a sequenced approach to implementing in small steps what may quite possibly be a comprehensive agenda of reform. A gradual approach to decentralization might work if there is likely to be a strong political commitment to reform in the foreseeable future and it is unlikely that groups adversely affected could get organized to block reform.
A gradual approach is sometimes advocated on the grounds that local governments have inadequate capacities to handle newly assigned responsibilities as in Indonesia, Pakistan, Uganda and Vietnam (see Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000 for Indonesia) or citizen participation in local government is weak due to a lack of interest and/or lack of education as in Bangladesh. Gradualism is also advocated when decentralization, if done incorrectly, could cause serious problems. Advocates for gradualism might say this is the case when i) local participation is weak and the local government is captured by the elite, or ii) service delivery and/or revenue collection break down because of weak local government capacity. Lack of capacity at the local level is often offered as a reason why decentralization should proceed slowly. But technical capacity can be contracted at first, and eventually be home-grown. What is essential is for the decentralization process to get started and to allow accountability mechanisms to take effect.
Are There Any True "Big Bang" Reformers?
The word "bang" is defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as "a loud percussive or explosive noise." While "Big Bang" reforms are defined in this paper as comprehensive decentralization reforms that occur over a short time, rapid but incomplete decentralization reforms in some countries, such as Indonesia, Pakistan and Uganda, may qualify as "big bang" approaches in the Merriam-Webster sense since these did cause "explosive" noises. These indeed are major reform efforts but do not qualify to be termed "big bang" based upon the definition adopted in this paper as they are lacking in some important dimensions. For instance, in all three countries, administrative decentralization has not happened and fiscal decentralization, especially tax decentralization, has been woefully inadequate.
Bottom Up vs. Top Down
A bottom-up process of decentralization entails resident-voters getting organized in Tiebout-type communities and declaring home rule for local public services and asking higher level governments to be supportive of these efforts. 8 This has been the dominant mode of decentralization in North America and Northern Europe. A top-down process of decentralization, on the other hand, represents a blueprint drawn by national governments to shift some of their responsibilities downwards. This has been the dominant process of decentralization followed in Southern Europe and all developing and transition countries.
A top down process is fraught with major difficulties. National government motivations as highlighted in section 2, have often less to do in improving efficiency, equity and accountability of local governance but more to do with short run political and bureaucratic imperatives (see Table 1 ). In view of these motivations, the decentralization initiatives are usually piecemeal and incomplete and result in either inadequate reform or even deform as various elements of this change work at cross-purposes and defy success in improving public sector performance.
Uniform versus Asymmetric Decentralization
Uniform decentralization implies that the legal status of a constituent unit is the sole criterion used for assigning responsibilities. For example while there may be differential assignment of responsibilities between the categories of cities, towns and villages, there will not be any such differentiation within each category (i.e. all cities will be treated equally). Uniform decentralization is desirable when various jurisdictions are relatively homogeneous with respect to their fiscal capacities and there is no special asymmetry of political or ethnic grouping that calls for special recognition. Asymmetric decentralization, on the other hand, means that constituent jurisdictions are allowed differentiated responsibilities due to political, fiscal or technical capacity considerations (see for a framework for asymmetric decentralization of local urban public services). Asymmetric decentralization at the regional level is practiced in a few countries such as Belgium, Canada, India, Malaysia (see Watts, 1999) , and now Indonesia. Asymmetric decentralization at the local level is more prevalent in practice (de facto) although such policies may not have been specifically prescribed in law (de jure).
In any case asymmetric decentralization makes capacity constraints as a hindrance to decentralization largely a non-issue.
Will Decentralization Be Sustained?
Decentralization initiatives are likely to be sustained if they were implemented after reaching a broad societal consensus. Sustainability potential is much higher for reforms stemming from grassroots support. If, on the other hand, decentralization was motivated by short-term goals, it increases the likelihood that the process will be reversed later on. Also, since decentralization in most countries is a top-down affair rather than the result of grassroots pressure from below, the interests that benefit from decentralization are rarely organized enough to defend it against reversals. Another reason for backtracking on decentralization is the struggle that politicians have with bureaucrats over its implementation. The struggle with bureaucrats over decentralization has taken place in scores of countries, including Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Morocco, and Tanzania. This, as noted earlier, may have implications for the debate on the pace of decentralization. "Big Bang" decentralization might reduce the resistance that the bureaucracy could effectively mount because they do not have time to regroup and fight the changing conditions, as they would be able to do with gradual change. Thus the pace of decentralization may affect the probability that reforms will be sustained.
Decentralization initiatives during their process of implementation may create dysfunctionalities. This may increase the likelihood that reforms are reversed.
Developing countries' experiences show that ill-conceived and poorly executed "decentralization" programs can undermine economic reform policies, exacerbate regional inequalities, empower local traditional elites, foster clientelism, and undermine the delivery of public services (see Remmer and Wibbels, 2000) . Eaton (2001) notes that in Argentina, President Menem partially reversed the previous decentralization of revenue to bring provincial governors into his fold. In the Philippines, national legislators were averse to decentralization as it lessened their political power and influence. In Pakistan, both the major political parties have distanced themselves from recent decentralization initiatives, since they see these as attempts by the military regime to weaken their political base.
Local Capture
Another important issue to consider is that of capture of local government by elites. When civic participation in local government is low, there is a greater risk that interest groups and local elites may capture local governments and direct resources toward their own priorities rather than toward improving the provision of local public goods and poverty alleviation. This is particularly a serious problem for rural areas in countries where there are large inequalities in land ownership (e.g. rural Sindh province of Pakistan). High civic participation and contestability in local elections are particularly important in the DTE context since the ability to "vote with one's feet" is limited.
However, the degree of local participation is likely to be endogenous in urban areas; as local governments take on larger roles in expenditure and taxing decisions, then the degree of participation in local government affairs should rise commensurately as the stakes increase for participation at the local level. In rural areas, without serious land reforms, outlook remains pessimistic for countries with concentrated land ownership.
A similar concern that election reforms in Latin America have attempted to address is the influence of national politics on local elections. When national and subnational elections coincide, there is a greater probability that national politics will influence results of local elections, reducing the accountability of local officials. In Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Venezuela, sub-national elections do not coincide with national elections. In addition, in some DTEs, local elections can only be contested on a non-party basis.
Lessons for the Future of Decentralization in Indonesia
Indonesia percent in 2000 to 28 percent in 2001. The World Bank was impressed with the speed of implementation and dubbed this program as the "big bang" (see World Bank, 2003) .
The program of decentralization implemented by Indonesia is commendable on a number of counts. It chose to decentralize responsibilities from the center to local governments and in the process by-passing the provinces. This move is thoughtful given the fragile nature of the Indonesian union and a potential threat to such union if the provinces become too powerful (see for an analysis of this issue). It also sought to enhance political participation and strengthen home rule for local services. It provides resources to match responsibilities in an unconditional manner to promote greater flexibility and autonomy of decision-making at the local level. It tried to redress long-standing grievances of resource rich provinces by giving them a greater access to resource revenues collected by the center from their provinces. It also introduced a formula-based equalization program (see box 1). Indonesian local governments now have the possibility to match local services with local preferences. The program involved big and bold steps executed with lightening speed. The World Bank characterization of the program as the "big bang" is correct in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary sense of being an explosive in nature. The program, however, could not be characterized as such using the definition of "big bang" presented in this paper. This is because the program has important missing links making it difficult for different pieces of the puzzle to fit together.
Missing Links in the Indonesian Decentralization Program
Important pieces of the puzzle missing from the Indonesian decentralization program implemented so far are as follows:
Bottom-up Accountability:
The program is solely focused on enhancing local autonomy with almost complete neglect of bottom-up accountability issues. The Indonesian program
implemented so far has failed to address accountability of local governments to residentcitizens. This is for several reasons.
First, lack of any tax decentralization means that local government would have the pleasure to spending money raised by someone else without experiencing the pain associated with raising taxes. This is likely to create incentives for fiscal mismanagement while enlarging the size of public spending. Over-centralization of taxing responsibility has been a major concern in the past (see others, 1994 and as subnational taxes were only a small proportion of total government revenues in the past (4% for municipal governments in 1997/98). This concern was not overcome in the recent program. Only 15% of kotamadya and 5% of kabupaten funds are derived from ownsource revenue.
Box 1: The New Fiscal Equalization Program in Indonesia (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU)
This program was first introduced in 2001 and has the following elements:
Total pool: Twenty-five percent of total national revenues (not including shared taxes) are reserved for transfers to provinces and kabupaten/kota in shares of 10% and 90% respectively. The same formula is used for kabupaten as kota, and it is only slightly modified for the provinces. Both the provincial and kabupaten/kota DAUs are further broken down into three components: lump sum, balancing factor (to maintain "hold harmless"), and the formula amount. For the provinces, the shares of each component are 20% lump sum, 50% formula, and 30% balancing factor. For the kabupaten/kota, the shares are 10% lump sum, 40% formula, and 50% balancing factor.
Lump sum: Twenty percent of the provinces' share of the DAU (which is 10% of the total DAU) is distributed as equal lump sum amounts to each province (by dividing the total lump sum allocation by the number of provinces). Kabupaten/kota receive 10% of the total kabupaten/kota share of the DAU (which is 90% of total DAU) as a lump sum distributed in equal amounts to each kabupaten and kotamadya.
The formula amount: In 2002, a formula was used to distribute 50% of the provincial DAU and 40% of the kabupaten/kota DAU. The formula amount allocated to each local government depends on that local government's share in the country-wide local government fiscal gap (sum of all local government fiscal gaps). The fiscal gap is the difference between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. The expenditure needs for each jurisdiction are approximated by multiplying a weighted index of four variables (population, area, cost differences, and poverty) with the average of all jurisdictions' expenditures. In 2001 equal weights were applied, but by 2002 higher weights were applied to population and cost. Fiscal capacity is approximated by adding an estimate of own source revenues to actual shared revenues (shared taxes and a share of natural resource revenue). Own source revenue is the predicted value based on a regression of own source revenue on the services component of regional GDP. The major shared taxes include the property tax, the land transfer fee, and the income tax (the latter is apportioned according to place of work rather than residence.) One should note that the extra funds that Papua and Aceh receive from natural resources is not taken into account in the calculation of their fiscal capacity and the shared natural resource revenues given to all local governments) only receive a weight of 75% in the fiscal capacity formula.
Balancing factor: The final 30% of the provincial DAU and 50% of the kabupaten/kota DAU is distributed as the balancing factor. Each local government's share of the amount allocated to the balancing factor is determined by that government's share of the total local government wage bill. It is intended to function as a "hold harmless" measure, ensuring that no local government receives less than the previous year's transfer payment. This component is due to be phased out of the DAU eventually.
Local governments are permitted to create new taxes, but they do not have control over good tax bases. Consequently, some distortionary new local taxes have been created.
The justification advanced for inaction on tax assignment was grounded in a concern, forcefully put forward by international development finance institutions, that such an assignment would put a strain on central government finances that were already under great stress. Such an argument to the extent that it holds water, suggests that a major program of decentralization is better undertaken when the country does not face any political or economic turbulence. If, however, the government has already embarked on such a course, then it must ensure that finance follows function. There is some empirical evidence to support this view as well. Recent empirical work demonstrates that concurrent decentralization of tax and expenditure responsibilities actually reduces the size of the public sector (see Ehdaie 1994) . Tax decentralization is a major issue that remains on the agenda in Indonesia. Government accountability to the people will be incomplete until the politicians making the decisions about expenditures are the same ones who have to justify tax rates to the populace. Good sources of revenue at the local level include property taxes, property transfer taxes, frontage charges, fuel taxes, environmental charges, hotel and entertainment taxes, tax base sharing of the personal income tax and user charges and fees.
Since most of the financing for local governments is now in the form of unconditional transfers from the center, it further weakens bottom-up accountability as funds flow like manna from heaven. 10 Such finance de-links local governments from their resident-voters and as a result the responsiveness of local governments to citizen voters and concerns for cost-efficiency are no longer assured. Such financing is also shown empirically to lead to a commensurate increase in the size of local public spending (Ehdaie, 1994) due to the "flypaper effect" (that is, grant money seems to stick where it first lands) but without any observable increase in the quality, quantity and responsiveness of public services.
In the absence of administrative decentralization, moral hazard and bureaucratic incentives to re-centralize have not been overcome. Industrial country experiences suggest that "citizen voice and exit" and local autonomy go hand-in-hand for the success of decentralization policies. In Indonesia, local government regulations are subject to review by the central government and the central government still sets the minimum salaries for civil servants of sub-national governments.
Expenditure assignment is an issue where confusion remains. In some respects There remain some aspects of the political/electoral system that may compromise accountability. As under the old system, the new election laws have not corrected the over-representation of some electoral districts. In addition, local chief executives are not directly elected, and there is no mechanism for popular recall. Finally, the new amendments to the constitution do not make clear that local governments' democratic structures are protected from central government interference or dismissal.
Coordination of the decentralization process by the central government has been lacking in some respects. Local governments, awaiting regulations from the central government that were never delivered, have proceeded with decentralization even without the guidelines. The result has been local government actions that conflict with central government laws.
Accountability for Results
Ironically, Indonesia abandoned one of the better-designed performance oriented fiscal transfer programs (Instruksi Presiden, or INPRES education, health and road transfers), which had helped it achieve national minimum service standards across the country. The primary school grant, initiated in 1973/74, provided funds to local governments based on the number of children age 7-12. An additional capital grant was provided to achieve uniform minimum standards of access to education across the country. The health grant implemented in 1974/75 provided local governments with funds based on a formula including medicine needs and requirements for health centers
(1 per 30,000 population) but left the decisions on execution to the local governments.
Likewise, the district/town road improvement grant allocated funds since 1979/80 to local governments based on such factors as road length, condition, density, and cost. Indonesia would be well advised to reconsider such grants to establish national minimum standards.
Such grants can also be used to provide incentives for competitive service delivery by public and private sectors as shown in Box 2. 11 .
Box 2: An Example of a Performance Oriented Grant: Education grant to set minimum standards while encouraging competition and innovation
Allocation basis among local governments: school age population. Distribution to providers: equal per pupil to both government and private schools. Conditions: universal access to primary and secondary education regardless of parents' income; improvements in achievement scores; no condition on the use of grant funds.
Penalties for non-compliance with standards: public censure, reduction of grant funds. Incentives for cost efficiency: retention of savings. Source: It is interesting to note that a number of local governments have recently adopted the criteria of financing schools based upon school enrollments as opposed to the centrally suggested criteria of equal fixed amount per school (see Hofman and Kaiser, 2002, p.6) . Recognizing the importance of such transfers, the Government of Indonesia in June 2002 announced plans for the introduction of DAK transfers for basic education, basic health services, and basic infrastructure in the 2003 budget. The design of such transfers had not been worked out at the time this paper was written.
Fiscal Equalization
Fiscal equalization is an important goal of the new fiscal transfer system, and to this end, an equalization program, the so-called Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU), has been
proposed. Under the new system, the equalization transfer is to be determined by a formula that calculates the fiscal gap between the expenditure needs of a local government (based on population, area, costs, and poverty) and its fiscal capacity (based on estimates of own and shared revenues) (see Box 1 for details). could not be assessed against a common yardstick. A simpler fiscal capacity equalization program using a national average standard, separately for each type of local governments (kota, kabupaten and the provinces) would have been more desirable. In short, the current equalization program requires a re-examination to make its design consistent with its objectives.
Bureaucratic Culture and Incentives
In Indonesia, in the past, centralization of responsibility and concentration of controls in bureaucracy created a culture of rent seeking and command and control with little concern for citizens' preferences and needs. Particularly in Indonesia, power has been firmly in the hands of the bureaucracy since the 1970s.
In Indonesia, operational capacity of the bureaucracy for local governance is deficient. This deficiency, however, can be overcome in the short run by borrowing such capacities from the national governments, from other local governments, from the private sector, and from civil society. In the long run, training of staff and creating an enabling environment for competitive service delivery through partnership with the private sector and civil society can augment operational capacity. A matter of greater concern in Indonesia is that the available capacity is not geared towards serving the citizen-voters. A similar rent seeking bureaucratic culture prevailed in industrial countries not long ago.
Over the years, however, industrial countries have shown a remarkable change in the performance of their public sectors. It is interesting to note that this change was brought about not through a system of hierarchical controls, as continue to be the focus in Indonesia but more through strengthened accountability to citizens at large.
Overall the emphasis of these systems of accountability has been to bring about a change in both the bureaucratic culture and the incentives public employees face. This is done by steering attention away from internal bureaucratic processes and input controls to accountability for results. While various countries have followed diverse policies to achieve this transformation, the underlying framework driving these reforms is uniform and firmly grounded in the results oriented management and evaluation framework (ROME). Under ROME, a results based chain provides a yardstick for measuring public sector performance.
Results Oriented Management and Evaluation (ROME) Chain:
Program ROME provides a coherent framework for strategic planning and management based upon learning and accountability in a decentralized environment. This framework calls for competitive wages and task specialization and lack of formal tenures for public personnel. Public providers are given the freedom to succeed or fail. Instead public employees hold the jobs so long as they are able to fulfill the terms of their contracts.
Persistent failures initiate the exit process. Responsiveness to citizenry and accountability for results are the cornerstone of this approach (see Box 3). A recent empirical study by Gurgur and Shah (2002) supports this view as it shows that political and bureaucratic culture and centralization of authority represent the most significant determinants of corruption in a sample of 30 countries. In view of this evidence, the ROME framework offers a great potential in Indonesia to improve public sector governance by nurturing responsive and accountable governance. Administrative decentralization is a pre-requisite for implementation of ROME. Administrative decentralization as discussed earlier requires lack of any ex ante controls over the decision by local governments to hire, fire and set terms of employment of local staff. To improve tax collection or the delivery of local public services, local government should have the freedom to contract own taxing and spending responsibilities. Furthermore, local governments should have the authority to pass bylaws in their spheres of responsibility without having to obtain prior clearance from the higher-level government.
Local governments in Indonesia do not as yet in practice have the authority to hire and fire senior local staff. The lack of such autonomy is considered the Achilles' heel of the devolution, as the centrally transferred civil servants have no personal stake in the success of the devolution.
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, while the Indonesian decentralization program is to be commended for its achievements over a short period of time, its long-term success is not assured as the program has failed to recognize and provide incentives for local governments to be accountable and responsive to their residents. Critical missing links in this regard identified in this paper include: (a) tax decentralization; (b) performance oriented transfers to set national minimum standards; (c) equalization to a standard; (d) administrative decentralization and (e) results-oriented management and evaluation.
Unless urgent action is taken to overcome these missing links, the bold Indonesian experiment may not bring the expected results in public sector performance in delivering quality local public services as demanded by its citizens. 
